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POLICY CHALLENGE
The European Semester cannot be effective if it is not legitimate. Legiti-
macy ultimately comes from national parliaments that vote on budgets and
on financial, labour and product market reforms, but national parliaments
are insufficiently involved. There are three options that could reduce the
tension between the EU level and the national level over the legitimacy of
the European Semester, while increasing its effectiveness: (i) Brussels
goes to capitals: the direct presence of European institutions in national
parliaments and the European
Parliament acting as a watchdog;
(ii) Capitals go to Brussels:
greater presence of national par-
liaments at European level; (iii) a
new treaty creating a soft political
union with some fiscal capacity
and a real shift in decision-
making authority to the EU.
Increasing effectiveness and legitimacy
THE ISSUE For markets, European economic governance faces a crisis of
policy effectiveness, while for citizens the European Union faces a
democratic legitimacy crisis. The introduction of the European Semester
economic policy surveillance system has not resolved these problems.
Policy guidance deriving from the Semester is not focused enough on areas
of significant spillovers and on problem countries, and national compliance
is often procedural rather than actual. This brings into question both the
Semester’s effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s new
intervention rights, which allow intrusion into national policy-making.
Source: Bruegel.
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ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY OF EU ECONOMIC POLICIES
1. European
Commission (2008),
‘EMU@10: successes
and challenges of
Economic and
Monetary Union’,
European Economy 2,
page 21.
2. A detailed study of
the European Semester
can be found in
Hallerberg, Marzinotto,
Wolff (2012).
HUGE DEBTS, INEFFICIENT
LABOUR MARKETS, fragmented,
poorly capitalised banking
systems: these major problems
that the European Union faces are
a testament to the failure of its
crisis-prevention system. Many of
the most difficult problems that
the EU must resolve if the euro-
area crisis is to be overcome,
such as macroeconomic
imbalances, were not the main
focus of the Maastricht Treaty,
which created the euro. For
example, the EU system of
economic governance did not
criticise private-sector
imbalances prior to the crisis, and
even considered them a sign of
the success of the monetary
union1. At the micro level, the EU's
2000-10 reform programme, the
Lisbon Agenda, failed to spur
meaningful change. These
failings mean that for markets,
European economic governance
is ineffective, while in the eyes of
many citizens the EU faces a
democratic legitimacy crisis.
Recognising the failure of the
Maastricht framework, a reform of
EU economic governance started
in 2010. One of the most notable
changes was the introduction of a
procedure under which the EU will
provide member states with
policy guidance before national
budgets are passed and reforms
decided. The goal of this
procedure, which is known as the
European Semester, is to ensure
that national priorities do not
conflict with policies agreed at EU
level but rather support EU
objectives. Since 2011, the
Semester has been combined
with tougher regulations in the
areas of structural and fiscal
policy.
The European Semester may be
regarded as an attempt to shift
the distribution of power between
the EU and the national level with-
out altering the Treaty. It is the
stretching of EU intervention
rights to the maximum without a
formal devolution of national sov-
ereignty. This has led to tension
between the EU and its member
states and concerns about the
democratic legitimacy of the new
economic governance framework.
One example stems from the first
Semester cycle in 2011 when the
draft recommendations pub-
lished for each country by the
European Commission were to
some extent revised by member
state representatives sitting in
the EU Council. Moreover, national
authorities, which ultimately pro-
vide legitimacy because they
have been put in place by their
citizens, do not always imple-
ment the EU recommendations.
The European Semester's effec-
tiveness has therefore been
limited. Greater use of binding
regulation is a way to increase
effectiveness because member
state compliance can be
enforced. But the consequence is
that the question of how to
achieve legitimacy at the EU level
becomes burning.
This is particularly evident in the
case of financial assistance. The
conditionality now in place for Ire-
land, Greece, and Portugal is
intrusive: it forces change in
domestic policies. In principle, it
makes European policy making
more effective. But democratic
legitimacy in the EU mostly
derives from the Council, which –
out of a position of financial
strength – negotiates financial
assistance via the troika of the
Commission, International Mone-
tary Fund and European Central
Bank with the member state con-
cerned. The member state
provides its share of legitimacy
with a memorandum of under-
standing out of a position of
weakness. National parliaments,
however – let alone citizens –
have only a limited influence over
the outcome.
As the third European Semester
cycle is about to start, this Policy
Brief assesses its effectiveness
and legitimacy focusing on recent
reforms. We provide suggestions
about how the tension between
national sovereignty and the
need for stronger supranational
powers can be resolved.
1 THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER
The European Semester is a
framework to improve economic
policy coordination in the EU. It
has been in place since January
2011. It was institutionalised in
December 2011 with the approval
of a set of laws designed to
strengthen economic coordina-
tion – the so-called six pack (see
Box 2)2. Enhanced EU coordina-
tion of economic policies is not a
new idea. It featured prominently
in the Delors Report (1988) and
was proposed again in the Sapir
Report (2004). But the European
Semester defines for the first time
the procedural details. The core
idea is for the EU to provide annu-
ally early policy guidance to EU
member states, and for the
member states to take on board
this guidance to prepare fiscal
and other reform plans (Box 1).
The European Semester changes
EU policy coordination in a
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3. At the end of the
European Semester,
each country receives
specific recommenda-
tions. The Commission
monitors Member State
progress in the imple-
mentation and can
propose sanctions for
non-compliance. Sanc-
tioning applies only to
the failure to bring the
fiscal deficit below 3
percent of GDP or to cor-
rect large macro-
economic imbalances.
There is no sanctioning
of more structural inter-
ventions in labour and
product and service
markets.
4. National Reform Pro-
grammes are submitted
at the same time as
Stability or Conver-
gence Programmes. The
idea is that the Com-
mission should do a
joint review of both the
macro and micro eco-
nomic policies the
Member State govern-
ment is proposing.
5. Formally, the AGS is
based on the EU2020
strategy progress report,
the Macroeconomic
Report and the Joint
Employment Report.
6. The two pack legisla-
tive proposal suggests
that the submission of
national documents is
anticipated to 15 April
in the case of euro area
countries.
number of major respects. Firstly,
the European Commission
defines a list of policy priorities in
the Annual Growth Survey (AGS)
well before national governments
have started preparing draft
budgets for the following year. EU
member states are obliged to take
the AGS into account when
drafting Stability or Convergence
Programmes and National Reform
Programmes. The new approach
to policy coordination also gives
the European Commission
increased intervention rights in
terms of both the areas in which
the Commission may intervene,
and the stringency of the
intervention (see Box 2). The
Commission's role is
strengthened relative to the EU
Council, which in some areas can
now only oppose a Commission
recommendation to impose
sanctions on non-performing
member states, rather than being
required to approve it3. The
European Semester also changes
EU policy coordination in that
fiscal and structural reforms are
considered jointly4.
The European Parliament fought –
rightly – for a stronger role in the
European Semester procedure,
and secured the right to Economic
Dialogues (introduced with the six
pack, see Box 2). These allow the
European Parliament to hold dis-
cussions with the other EU
institutions and with national rep-
resentatives on economic issues,
thereby introducing an element of
parliamentary accountability.
BOX 1: THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER TIMELINE
The European Semester begins with the publication by the European
Commission of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), which is a list of gen-
eral policy priorities for the EU and its member states5.
The EU Council (grouped in different formations) and the European
Parliament debate the AGS until March, when the spring European
Council formally endorses it.
Following endorsement by the Spring European Council, EU member
states must take EU policy guidance into account when drafting their
Stability or Convergence Programmes (SCPs) and National Reform
Programmes (NRPs), both of which they must submit to the Commis-
sion by 30 April each year6.
The European Commission evaluates national plans to ensure that
proposed measures respect the priorities and objectives identified in
the AGS. Around the end of May, the Commission publishes its own
assessment of national fiscal and structural plans and releases both
country-specific recommendations and euro-area recommendations.
The Council then approves draft recommendations, the June Euro-
pean Council endorses them, and finally the Council publishes the
country-specific recommendations, which are binding on EU member
states.
The six pack allows the European Parliament to make use of the Eco-
nomic Dialogue instrument to engage in a discussion with EU
institutions and national representatives on issues relating to the
European Semester – whether concerning the Commission’s AGS or
the country-specific recommendations or the national implementa-
tion of the recommendations – at almost any point in time throughout
the Semester process (see Table 1).
Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July
European
Commission
Adoption: AGS
Adoption:
CSRs/ EARs
EU Council Debate and orientations on AGS
Finalisation and adop-
tion of CSRs and EARs
European Parliament European Dialogue
European Council
Endorse-
ment of AGS
Endorsement
CSRs/ EARs
Member states
National Parliaments discuss SCPs
and NRPs
Submission:
SCPs/NRPs
Table 1: European Semester timeline
Key: AGS = Annual Growth Survey; CSRs = country-specific recommendations; EARs = euro-area recommendations; SCPs = Stabil-
ity and Convergence Programmes; NRPs = National Reform Programmes. Source: Bruegel.
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2 EFFECTIVENESS
A change in EU economic gover-
nance will be effective if it
addresses the short-term crisis or
makes crises less likely in the
long-term. The European Semes-
ter will be effective if it reduces
adverse spillovers between
member states and discourages
countries from implementing poli-
cies that exacerbate existing
crises or increase the probability
of future crises. On reducing
adverse spillovers, it is question-
able if European Commission and
Council recommendations focus
on the policies with the greatest
relevance for the monetary union.
An analysis of EU recommenda-
tions to member states under the
European Semester (the analysis
can be found in Hallerberg et al,
2012) shows that references to
the impact of policy measures on
the EU as a whole, or the incorpo-
ration of a quantification of
potential spillover effects are
quite rare7.
An illustration comes from the
recommendations for Germany,
which is an interesting case
because its policy decisions are
likely to generate spillovers,
because of its size. Germany
enjoys a large current account
surplus. One would expect a
policy discussion about if and
how this surplus could be
reduced as part of a broader effort
to rebalance the euro area. The
Council recommendations to Ger-
many do not address the ‘surplus
problem’ but look at the conduct
of sound fiscal policy. Recom-
mendations include the full
implementation of the debt brake
rule8 and increased spending on
education and research; the need
to address structural weaknesses
in the financial sector, and of
state-level banks in particular
(Landesbanken); the reduction in
the country’s high tax wedge,
which penalises employment cre-
ation; and reform of the energy
sector. While each recommenda-
tion might be laudable in its own
right, the link to the recession in
Europe and the rebalancing of the
euro area is not at all evident. 
Similar examples exist for other
member states. In the recommen-
dations to Italy, the wording on
structural reforms to improve
competitiveness is extremely
weak. The recommendations do
not clearly link domestic policy
reforms with the need to reduce
negative spillovers at European
level. This is both a procedural
and a substance problem. Proce-
durally, policy recommendations
are not justified by an EU or euro-
area logic but are rather a mix of
different considerations relating
to broader goals. On substance,
many recommendations appear
to be more important from a
domestic than a European point
of view. 
To be fair, the EU has not com-
pletely ignored the euro-area
dimension and the importance of
spillover effects for different
countries and policy areas. One
indication of this is that the Euro-
pean Commission and Council
issue not just country-specific
recommendations but also sepa-
rate recommendations to the euro
area. Still, this seems like an
empty exercise. It is not clear who
7. One other related
issue is that EU recom-
mendations so far lack
not only a clear identifi-
cation of spillovers in
the euro area but also
visible prioritisation
both across countries
and across policy
areas. All countries
receive their respective
3-5 policy recommen-
dations with essentially
similar urgency.
8. The debt brake rule is
a balanced budget
provision introduced in
Germany in 2009,
which implies that from
2016 onwards the
Federal Government
cannot run a structural
deficit of more than
0.35 percent of GDP
and from 2020 the
states (Länder) must
have a balanced
structural budget.
BOX 2: THE SIX PACK
The European Semester builds on Articles 121 and 148 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, according to which EU member states are required to coordinate their economic and employment
policies so that the correct functioning of the monetary union can be secured. The six pack, a package of
six laws in force since December 2011, codifies the European Semester, clarifying its constituent parts, the
stakeholders and their involvement in the process.
The six pack is particularly important for the operation of the Semester in a number of ways. First, it intro-
duces the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), by which macroeconomic imbalances other than
fiscal imbalances are made subject to sanctions. The Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) is the instrument to
detect those countries where a more thorough investigation in the MIP is warranted.
Second, the six pack changes some of the voting modalities thereby strengthening the role of the Commis-
sion relative to the Council.
Third, the six-pack introduces the Economic Dialogue, which allows the European Parliament to more
strongly than before question the other EU institutions and to invite national government representatives
to hold them to account for their actions.
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9. The German case
demonstrates that
Member State govern-
ments generally
‘implement’ recommen-
dations they were
already doing anyway
and ignore recommen-
dations that would
involve truly new
reforms.
10. Van Rompuy,
Herman (2012) and
Future of Europe Group
(2012).
11. A good press review
is ‘The eurozone: an
ever-deeper democratic
deficit’, The Economist,
26 May 2012.
12. At the same time,
there is at least some
hope that this may be
evolving—in a recent
special issue of Elec-
toral Studies, which
analysed a set of data
from the 2009 Euro-
pean Parliamentary
elections, there is some
evidence that in
Member States where
there was a lot of cover-
age of European issues
there was also voting
more along European
instead of national
lines. See Electoral
Studies, March 2011,
vol 30 (1), edited by
Sara Hobolt and Mark
Franklin.
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deficit’ in Europe. For Scharpf
(1999), it is important to consider
both input legitimacy and output
legitimacy, and we will use that
template here. Input legitimacy is
government by the people. For
this to exist, the voters have to
participate. In this respect, the EU
has several widely recognised
flaws, as many academic and
media commentators have
noted11. Member states, rather
than the people themselves,
appoint EU commissioners. The
main representative body is the
European Parliament, but partici-
pation in European parliamentary
elections, has dropped progres-
sively since direct elections were
introduced in 1979. Academic
work suggests that people often
vote in such elections based on
their views of their current govern-
ment, not on the basis of
European political developments,
though there is some evidence
that this might be starting to
change12.
Scharpf ’s definition of output
legitimacy is democracy for the
people. This is harder to judge, but
again there are institutional pre-
requisites. There should be
electoral accountability — it
should be possible for the public
to remove non-performing policy-
makers. Follesdal and Hix (2006)
fault the EU especially on this
account: it is not possible for
voters to remove an unpopular
commissioner. Scharpf (1999)
also wants independent expertise
that is meant to encourage out-
comes that are good for the EU
population more generally. On
this count, the European Central
Bank and the EU Court of Justice
are effective. Policies that
improve the welfare of all citizens
are also output-legitimate in
Scharpf’s definition. In the current
context characterised by signifi-
cant imbalances the definition of
the general welfare of all citizens
is complicated and makes the
concept of output legitimacy less
relevant than that of input legiti-
macy. Our focus is thus on input
legitimacy and on the aspect of
output legitimacy that deals with
the capacity of European voters
(or their legitimate representa-
tives) to hold EU institutions to
account.
3.1 The role of the European
Parliament
The Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union gives only
limited authority to the European
Parliament in the exercise of eco-
nomic policy coordination. The
Parliament has an information
right under macro-economic sur-
veillance (Articles 121 and 126 of
the Treaty). More specifically, the
EU Council President and the
Commission must report to the
European Parliament on the
results of the macro-economic
surveillance exercise and the
approved EU recommendations.
The European Parliament is thus
informed but is has no power to
change recommendations relat-
ing to economic policy
coordination in the EU.
The situation has slightly
improved since the adoption of
the the six pack and the introduc-
tion of the Economic Dialogue
(see Box 2). The European Parlia-
ment can now step into the
Semester on its own initiative, at
almost at any point in the proce-
dure, whether to discuss the AGS
after the spring European Council,
the euro-area recommendations
are addressed to and who is sup-
posed to implement them.
Euro-area considerations should
not be treated in a separate docu-
ment, but should cut across all
country-specific recommenda-
tions for euro-area countries.
Once adverse spillovers are effec-
tively identified and possibly
even quantified, there remains
the problem of domestic policy
implementation. The evidence
collected by Hallerberg et al
(2012) for a sample of six EU
countries indicates that there is a
problem in domestic implementa-
tion. More precisely, EU
recommendations were found to
have not altered dramatically the
national process of policy formu-
lation, especially when the
suggested reforms are likely to
erode rents and dominant posi-
tions in product and service
markets9.
3 LEGITIMACY
The problem of the legitimacy of
the new economic governance
system is directly linked to its
effectiveness. Two recent reports
discuss the issue. In the so-called
Report of the Four Presidents from
June 2012, the authors call for
more involvement of the Euro-
pean Parliament and national
parliaments to strengthen “demo-
cratic legitimacy and
accountability”. The Report of the
Foreign Ministers three months
later similarly focused on the
same sets of institutions10.
But what is democratic legiti-
macy? Since at least Weiler et al
(1995), there has been a growing
debate about a ‘democratic
or in reaction to the final country-
specific recommendations. It still
cannot change recommenda-
tions. Yet, while such involvement
does not come with any decision-
making rights, it still represents
an instrument to exercise moral
suasion and to hold EU institu-
tions to account.
3.2The role of national
parliaments
The budget is the most important
part of the parliamentary deci-
sion-making power in each
country. Structural reforms in
terms of labour market laws, prod-
uct market policies and
competition policies are also cen-
tral elements of parliamentary
decision-making processes. More
intrusive EU intervention into
national decision-making pro-
cesses therefore raises the
question of how policy outcomes
are legitimised. While the Euro-
pean Semester assigns a weak
role to the European Parliament,
the Semester's legitimacy would
not be an issue if there was evi-
dence that national parliaments
are truly involved in the process.
To investigate this issue, in a pre-
vious project for the European
Parliament, we submitted a
survey to the EU27 national par-
liaments to determine the extent
to which they discuss Stability or
Convergence Programmes,
National Reform Programmes and
the EU’s recommendations. The
results presented in Hallerberg et
al (2012) may be summarised as
follows13.
First, only the parliaments of
France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the
United Kingdom discuss Stability
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13. We received replies
to our survey from all
countries except
Bulgaria.
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and Convergence Programmes.
Where the programmes are
discussed, it is mostly because
the parliament is already involved
in the discussion of government
multi-annual fiscal plans other
than its Stability or Convergence
Programme. Italy and Portugal are
exceptions to this: their
parliaments discuss only the
‘European’ and not ‘domestic’
documents.
Second, parliamentary commit-
tees are much more involved than
plenaries in the discussion of
European documents. In the
majority of countries both the
budget and EU affairs committees
discuss either Stability and Con-
vergence Programmes (eg
Finland) or National Reform Pro-
grammes (eg Cyprus, UK) or both
(eg Estonia, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, Slovenia,
Sweden).
Third, a significant number of EU
countries have not discussed
Council recommendations
received at the end of the Euro-
pean Semester cycle, even if
member states are indeed asked
to include those recommenda-
tions in the measures listed in the
national budget law for the con-
secutive year, and in laws on
broader macroeconomic issues.
Where the EU recommendations
have been discussed, the debate
concerned both fiscal recommen-
dations under Stability and
Growth Pact provisions, and non-
binding structural reform
recommendations, and were
mostly dealt with by European
affairs committees as if they were
more a matter of the relationship
with the EU, rather than being cen-
tral to citizens’ welfare.
We therefore conclude that, so far,
national parliaments have not
sufficiently discussed and
debated, let alone provided legiti-
macy for, the EU Council
recommendations.
4 THREE WAYS TOWARDS MORE
EFFECTIVENESS AND
LEGITIMACY
We see three options for strength-
ening the democratic legitimacy,
and in turn the effectiveness, of
the new EU economic governance
framework: (a) enhance the role
of the European institutions at
member state level while increas-
ing the role of the European
Parliament in holding EU institu-
tions to account, (b) enhance the
role of national parliaments at the
EU level, and (c) create a legiti-
mate political union, which would
require the role and decision-
making powers of the European
Parliament to be enhanced in a
significant fashion. All three
options have in common that they
attempt to improve the process of
defining the common European
interest, which should render the
EU more effective and legitimate.
The first two options could – at
least to some extent – be done in
the framework of the current
treaties. The third option would
likely require treaty changes.
4.1 Brussels goes to capitals
Input legitimacy would increase if
the European Commission would
have more regular contacts with
national parliaments. The October
2012 visit of European Central
Bank president Mario Draghi to
the German Bundestag sets an
example that Commissioners
should follow14. One can argue, of
course, that contact with the Euro-
pean Parliament is enough;
contacts with national parlia-
ments would be unduly
burdensome in terms of time and
expense. Yet the EU is by no
means a self-contained mature
polity, and the European Parlia-
ment is not the sole, or even the
main, source of input legitimacy15.
More outreach to national legisla-
tures by Brussels would relieve
national governments from being
the main communication channel
between the EU and national par-
liaments. While Hallerberg et al
(2012) showed that many
national parliaments are active
and debate the national docu-
ments submitted to the EU, far
fewer parliaments debate the rec-
ommendations issued by the
Council. Yet, that is the stage at
which concrete policy measures
should be formulated and imple-
mented by national parliaments.
A stronger presence by the
responsible Commissioner, for
example in the form of a hearing
at a number of national parlia-
ments each year, would be a
strong step towards making EU
coordination more effective.
Brussels would go to capitals if
the inter-parliamentary coopera-
tion between the European
Parliament and national parlia-
ments is exploited to its full
potential. The existing Interparlia-
mentary Committee meetings16
should be used as a forum to
strengthen communication chan-
nels. The meetings should be
regular, open to the public, possi-
bly even held in different capitals
and include meetings with a
broader group of national parlia-
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14. See
http://www.ft.com/intl/cm
s/s/0/0008a432-1e01-
11e2-ad76-00144feabdc
0.html#axzz2BTgmxy9y.
15. The German
Constitutional Court even
questioned the
democratic legitimacy of
the European
Parliament, see
http://www.bundesverfas
sungsgericht.de/presse
mitteilungen/bvg09-
072en.html.
16. See
http://www.europarl.euro
pa.eu/webnp/cms/lang/e
n/pid/11.
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mentarians. These steps would
also increase the visibility of the
European Semester in national
media.
At the same time, the European
Parliament should play a greater
role in holding the EU institutions
to account for their decisions. The
six pack has created a strong
instrument for that purpose. The
European Parliament should build
on the Economic Dialogue to
invite representatives from Euro-
pean institutions on a regular
basis. We see at least three points
in the cycle for this: i) at the
beginning of the cycle shortly
before the AGS is published, so
that the dialogue can have an
impact on the definition of early
policy priorities; ii) after the publi-
cation of the AGS to assess the
extent to which the European
Commission has taken the Parlia-
ment’s policy preferences into
account; and iii) when the Euro-
pean Council endorses
country-specific recommenda-
tions, especially if there are
discrepancies between these and
the initial European Commission
draft recommendations. The Eco-
nomic Dialogue also allows the
European Parliament to invite
member state representatives.
This could be an effective way of
increasing the visibility of Euro-
pean decisions at national level.
4.2 Capitals go to Brussels 
A second approach consists of
giving national parliaments a
more explicit and direct role in the
European decision-making
process. The EU Treaty gives
national parliaments the right to
be informed about EU activities
and to voice objections to EU
policies, even if this is restricted
to specific policy areas (eg
judicial cooperation in civil
matters, see Article 12 and
Protocol 1). Inter-parliamentary
cooperation, mentioned in
section 4.1, is the key instrument
through which national
parliaments engage in a dialogue
with the European Parliament.
The Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance (TSCG),
which is intended to safeguard
the stability of the euro area, and
was signed by EU governments
with the exception of the Czech
Republic and the UK in March
2012, refers to the need to
involve national parliaments in
the emerging system of EU fiscal
governance. The aim is to create a
system in which the national pre-
rogatives in the budgetary
processes can be voiced at a
European level, while European
commitments are effectively
transmitted to the national level.
The entry into force of the TSCG
thus puts the spotlight on
national parliaments. The ques-
tion is whether this will be
effective. How does the emerging
model of decentralisation of fiscal
policy impact on the capacity of
parliaments to put a strain on
national budgets?
The stringency and intrusiveness
of European fiscal commitments
puts in question the role of
national parliaments especially in
those countries where the
parliament plays a strong role in
the budgetary process (eg
Germany and Finland). The TSCG
is a genuine attempt to
reinvigorate their role by setting
up a fiscal governance framework
with a strong centre, the European
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Commission, but which is at the
same time decentralised, as all
contracting parties commit to
introduce a binding debt brake
rule in their national legislation.
The advantage in terms of legiti-
macy from this approach is that,
in the absence of a European
fiscal union of some sort17,
national parliaments are the legit-
imate representatives, especially
now that taxpayers’ money is
used to fund financial assistance
in crisis countries (see Pisani-
Ferry, 2012).
4.3 Going beyond current treaties
A third option would be to create
some form of political/fiscal
union, which would also require
increasing the role of the Euro-
pean Parliament in decision
making. This ultimately will
require Treaty changes. Within the
current treaties, the European
Parliament cannot change deci-
sions taken by the Council, and it
has no taxation powers. Also,
national parliaments set labour
about the Europeanisation of
national policies, the second
about the re-nationalisation of
European policies and the last
about a soft political union with
some fiscal capacity. The first two
options would be the easiest to
accomplish, and they would not
require any Treaty change. There
is an argument to be made, how-
ever, that a jump towards greater
fiscal federalism would be the
most effective option for bringing
an end to the current crisis, and
would provide the necessary
tools to fight future crises. In this
case, the direct involvement of
the European Parliament would
also increase legitimacy. 
Regardless of which path the EU
decides to take, it does need to
move down one of them and will
probably eventually have to move
to the more federal option. Mar-
kets have a point when they judge
the current system to be ineffec-
tive, and citizens have reason to
worry that the current system
lacks legitimacy. The status quo is
not acceptable on either count.
17. For a proposal for a
fiscal union in Europe,
see Marzinotto, Sapir
and Wolff (2011). 
18. The same proposal
was put forward by
Angela Merkel speaking
in front of the European
Parliament on 7 Novem-
ber 2012. It was
suggested by Hallerberg
et al (2012).
and product market laws. A Treaty
change would thus be required if
the European Parliament were to
be granted some form of taxation
power to create a sufficiently
large buffer that supports coun-
tries in difficulties. A form of fiscal
union could be created by provid-
ing the EU with a budget for
stabilisation purposes, with deci-
sions on spending legitimised by
the involvement of the European
Parliament, which would approve
this budget as it does now for the
EU27 budget. This type of fiscal
union would raise the question of
whether a split of the European
Parliament into a euro-area
assembly when it comes to deci-
sions on the euro-area budget
would be necessary18. While divi-
sive, such an institutional set-up
may increase the legitimacy of
the EU by creating a parliamen-
tary counterpart to the Eurogroup. 
5 CONCLUSIONS
The three alternatives we envis-
age correspond to three different
visions of Europe. The first is
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